APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL REPLICATION RESULTS




FIGURE A.1. Increased Charity Valuations: Charitable Contribution where indifferent to \$10 for self

Table A.1. Exley Regression Table, by Probability

		Ex	ley			Replic	cation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	P=0.95	P=0.75	P=0.50	P=0.25	P=0.95	P=0.75	P=0.50	P=0.25
charity	1.84*	3.03**	-2.11*	-2.54**	3.83*	0.51	-0.94	-1.28
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.83)	(0.62)	(0.59)
tradeoff	-1.14	4.25*	10.22***	5.22*	-4.00	3.83	5.02	3.74
	(0.53)	(0.06)	(0.00)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.28)
charity*tradeoff	-23.16***	-21.45***	-12.76***	-0.75	-18.62***	-11.39**	-0.34	3.06
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.79)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.94)	(0.57)
Constant	90.53***	71.10***	31.97***	13.55***	85.63***	67.09***	34.18***	22.62***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Charity-Tradeoff effect	-24.29***	-17.19***	-2.54	4.47*	-22.62***	-7.59 **	4.67*	6.80**
	(3.35)	(2.85)	(1.71)	(2.27)	(3.34)	(3.42)	(2.49)	(3.27)
Observations	228	228	228	228	224	224	224	224

Note: Standard errors clustered at participant level, shown in parentheses. Significance: *-(p < 0.10), **-(p < 0.05), ***-(p < 0.01). OLS estimates with dependent variables of relative lottery valuations. Valuations in self-dollars are scaled as percentages of \$10, while valuations in charity-dollars are scaled as percentages of their X. Participants with censored X values are not included. In the *Charity-Tradeoff* effect row (not given in the original study tables) we provide the sum of Tradeoff and the interaction terms. interaction terms

Table A.2. Exley Regression Table

			Exley	ley					Repli	Replication		
		OLS			Interval	Tobit		0	OLS		Interval	Tobit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
charity	0.06 (0.82)	0.06 (0.82)	0.97 (0.20)	0.06 (0.82)	0.23 (0.87)	1.30 (0.80)	0.53 (1.20)	0.53 (1.20)	0.04 (0.97)	0.53 (1.21)	0.76 (1.29)	0.49 (1.29)
tradeoff	5.30** (2.02)	5.30** (2.02)	19.91*** (0.00)	5.30** (2.02)	6.81*** (2.31)	27.50*** (3.59)	2.15 (2.19)	2.15 (2.19)	5.78** (0.01)	2.15 (2.19)	2.77 (2.42)	7.37*** (2.56)
charity*tradeoff	-15.09*** (3.40)	-15.09*** (3.40)	-39.64*** (0.00)	-15.09*** (3.41)	-16.53*** (3.77)	-47.44*** (5.29)	-6.82* (3.74)	-6.82* (3.74)	-11.50*** (3.75)	-6.82* (0.01)	-7.73* (4.12)	-13.43*** (4.35)
I(P=0.95)				70.38*** (1.87)						56.27*** (2.74)		
I(P=0.90)				66.32*** (1.76)								
I(P=0.75)				54.67*** (1.46)						41.79*** (2.55)		
I(P=0.50)				36.44*** (1.18)								
I(P=0.25)				18.14*** (1.09)						11.52*** (1.65)		
I(P=0.10)				6.01*** (0.63)								
Constant	51.79*** (0.96)	51.79*** (0.61)	50.45*** (0.00)	15.80*** (1.36)	51.83*** (0.97)	50.50*** (0.80)	52.38*** (1.09)	52.38*** (0.74)	52.21*** (2.26)	24.98*** (0.00)	52.78*** (1.13)	52.46*** (1.20)
Ind FE	oN o	Yes	No	No No	No No	No Vec	No No	Yes	No	No No	oN No	No
Observations	1596	1596	2772	1596	1596	2772	896	896	1088	896	896	1088

Note: Standard errors clustered at participant level, shown in parentheses. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Dependent variables are lottery valuations. Valuations in self-dollars are scaled as percentages of \$10, while valuations in charity-dollars are scaled as percentages of their X. Probability fixed effects are shown when included, and "Ind FE" indicated whether or not individual fixed effects are included. "Censored X" indicate whether or not participants with censored X values are included.

Table A.3. Di Tella Regression Table

	Di T	Tella	Repli	cation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Effect of <i>Able</i> =	=8 (versus .	Able=2) on		
Tokens Taken	5.233***	5.150***	2.590***	2.670***
	(0.363)	(0.402)	(0.585)	(0.583)
Is Corrupt	0.369***	0.325***	0.246**	0.225*
	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.112)	(0.116)
%-Corrupt	0.158***	0.151***	0.049	0.030
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Implied Effect	of Tokens	Taken on		
Is Corrupt	0.071***	0.063**	0.095**	0.084*
_	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.044)
%-Corrupt	0.030***	0.029***	0.019	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	65	65	77	76

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Implied effect of *Tokens Taken* is from an instrumental variable regression where the endogenous variable is *Tokens Taken* and the instrument is Able=8. Controls are gender, age, general trust, and major. Significance: *** -1%, ** -5%, * -10%.

Table A.4. Dana Table 1

	Da	na	Replie	cation
	Proportion choosing "A" (unfair choice)	Proportion revealing true payoffs	Proportion choosing "A" (unfair choice)	Proportion revealing true payoffs
Dictators' ch	noices			
Baseline HI (State 1) HI (State 2)	5/19 (26%) 10/16 (63%) 13/16 (81%)	- 8/16 (50%) 10/16(63%)	37/213 (17%) 54/98 (55%) 79/115 (69%)	- 39/98 (40%) 59/115 (51%)

Table A.5. Dana Table 2

	Dan	a	Replication		
	Information acquisition choice	Proportion choosing "A"	Information acquisition choice	Proportion choosing "A"	
State 1 Payoffs	Chose to reveal (8/16, 50%)	2/8 (25%)	Chose to reveal (39/98, 40%)	7/39 (18%)	
, ,,	Chose not to reveal (8/16, 50%)	8/8 (100%)	Chose not to reveal (59/98, 60%)	47/59 (80%)	
State 2 Payoffs	Chose to reveal (10/16, 63%)	9/10 (90%)	Chose to reveal (59/115, 51%)	58/59 (98%)	
	Chose not to reveal (6/16, 38%)	4/6 (67%)	Chose not to reveal (56/115, 49%)	41/56 (73%)	

APPENDIX B. DISCUSSION SUPPLEMENT

Table B.1. Type Definitions

		Types	
_	Excuse-Seeking	Selfish	Generous
Di Tella et al. (Able = 8 Allocators)	Believe partner corrupt Take over 5 tokens	Believe partner <i>not</i> corrupt Take any tokens	Neither Excuse-Seeking nor Selfish
Exley (95% List)	Uncensored participants Charity w. Tradeoff < Self Charity == Self, No Tradeoff	Censored Participants	Neither Excuse-Seeking nor Selfish
Dana et al.	Baseline: (5,5) HI: Do Not Reveal	Baseline: (6,1) HI: (6,x)	Baseline: (5,5) HI: Reveal

Note: Notes: Information environment definitions follow Exley (2015).

For Exley decisions, Charity == Self was defined as switching within 5 percentage points of each other in the original or 4 rows in the replication.

Generous definitions are: DiTella et al. – believe partner is corrupt and take under 5 tokens or believe partner is not corrupt and don't take any tokens. Exley – Uncensored participants who either don't undervalue the charity-lottery with a tradeoff or have differing charity-self risk preferences.

Table B.2. Exley Regression Table, Heterogeneous Effects

		Exl	ey				Replication	on
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
charity	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.53	0.39	1.86	1.73
	(0.82)	(0.80)	(1.26)	(1.23)	(1.20)	(1.24)	(1.81)	(1.84)
tradeoff	5.30**	5.30***	3.15	3.15	2.15	5.08**	0.29	2.89
	(2.02)	(1.82)	(2.83)	(2.38)	(2.19)	(2.09)	(3.21)	(2.85)
charity*tradeoff	-15.09***	-15.09***	-9.02*	-9.02**	-6.82*	-11.96***	-4.57	-9.07*
	(3.40)	(3.18)	(4.55)	(3.90)	(3.74)	(3.23)	(5.21)	(4.65)
$(X-ar{X})$		-0.11		-0.11		0.29**		0.29**
		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.12)
charity* $(X - \bar{X})$		0.26*		0.26^{*}		-0.06		-0.06
• • •		(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.15)		(0.15)
$tradeoff^*(X-ar{X})$		1.11***		1.11***		1.28***		1.30***
		(0.31)		(0.31)		(0.29)		(0.29)
charity*tradeoff* $(X - \bar{X})$		-1.56***		-1.56**		-2.23***		-2.25***
		(0.57)		(0.59)		(0.44)		(0.43)
wiggler			-0.62	-0.62			1.00	1.23
			(2.17)	(2.21)			(2.21)	(2.14)
charity*wiggler			0.90	0.89			-1.81	-1.86
			(1.65)	(1.60)			(2.46)	(2.46)
tradeoff*wiggler			4.47	4.45			4.10	5.11
			(4.54)	(3.99)			(4.72)	(3.93)
charity*tradeoff*wiggler			-13.48**	-13.45**			-3.62	-5.38
			(6.46)	(5.28)			(8.01)	(6.50)
selfish			2.68	2.67			3.83	3.70
			(2.54)	(2.49)			(4.44)	(4.47)
charity*selfish			-1.14	-1.13			-4.83	-4.80
•			(2.17)	(2.10)			(4.69)	(4.68)
tradeoff*selfish			4.59	4.63			0.31	-0.30
			(5.25)	(5.09)			(6.23)	(6.23)
charity*tradeoff*selfish			-12.10	-12.16			-5.94	-4.89
,,			(9.78)	(10.04)			(11.80)	(11.75)
Constant	51.79***	51.79***	51.33***	51.33***	52.38***	53.06***	51.52***	52.11***
	(0.96)	(0.96)	(1.30)	(1.30)	(1.09)	(1.05)	(1.75)	(1.75)
Observations	1596	1596	1596	1596	896	896	896	896

^{*} p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, **** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level. Censored participants are excluded. Dependent variables are lottery valuations, Y. Valuations in self-dollars are scaled as percentages of \$10, and valuations in charity-dollars are scaled as percentages of X. The results are from the main regression modified to include the shown interactions. $(X - \bar{X})$ is a participant's X minus the average X. Selfish is an indicator for choosing A in the revealed-unaligned state. Wiggler is an indicator for choosing B in the revealed-unaligned state but A in the choice-to-reveal question after choosing not to reveal the state.

APPENDIX C. COMPACT VERSION OF DI TELLA ET AL.

Participants in the Exley replication complete a task designed to mimic Allocator decisions in DiTella et al. Participants are randomly matched and given an extra \$1. They have three options: (i) *Keep* their dollar (and not affect their partner's payoff); (ii) *Pass* to charity (potentially providing a \$4 donation); or (iii) attempt to *Take* their partner's donation. Payoffs are presented in Table C.1. Participants report beliefs over their partner's actions and the session-level prevalence of *Take*. ¹

TABLE C.1. Payoffs

	Keep	Pass	Take
Keep	1 personal, 1 personal	1 personal, 4 donation	1 personal, 0
Pass	4 donation, 1 personal	4 donation, 4 donation	0, 4 personal
Take	0, 1 personal	4 personal, 0	0, 0

Note: Personal denotes a payoff for the participant and *donation* denotes money donated to the Children's Hospital on their behalf. 0 denotes no personal payment or donation.

Choosing *Take* is comparable the corrupt option in Di Tella et al.. Participants can justify *Keep* by believing their partner choose *Take*, much as Allocators can justify taking more tokens by distorting beliefs about their partner's corruption. However, as shown in Table C.2, we do not find evidence of this belief distortion. Instead, participants who chose *Keep* ascribe consistency between their behavior and that of their partner. Participants selecting *Pass* also ascribe this consistency, but most who try to *Take* believe their partner will *Pass*.²

TABLE C.2. Partner Beliefs and Actions

	Believe Keep	Believe Take	Believe Pass
Decide Keep	11	4	2
Decide Take	1	8	11
Decide Pass	0	2	22

Note: Rows are a participant's choice, columns are participant beliefs over their partner's choice.

¹Half are paid for the game and a quarter for each for their partner-level and session-level beliefs. Sessions with odd numbers of participants paid one additional participant for session-level beliefs.

²Surprisingly, nearly half of those selecting *Take* do not believe their partner chose *Pass*. Participants may have a distribution of beliefs over their partner's actions, and treat picking *Take* as a lottery paying \$4 with probability p, the likelihood their partner picks *Pass*. If $p \in [.25,.50]$ and q (the probability their partner picks *Take*) > p, a risk-averse agent who does not care about the charity may *Take* and indicate their partner also did so.

REFERENCES

- **Dana, Jason, Roberto A Weber, and Jason Xi Kuang**, "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," *Economic Theory*, 2007, 33 (1), 67–80.
- **Exley, Christine L**, "Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: The role of risk," *Review of Economic Studies*, 2015, 83 (2), 587–628.
- **Tella, Rafael Di, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino, and Mariano Sigman**, "Conveniently upset: Avoiding altruism by distorting beliefs about others' altruism," *American Economic Review*, 2015, 105 (11), 3416–42.

Screenshots from the Exley Replication

Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. You will remain anonymous in the experiment. Your decisions will be identified using an ID number which is not linked to your name. Any research data collected during the course of the study will only identify your decisions by that number. Your participation in this study is voluntary. Should you change your mind about participating, you can withdraw from the study at any time. Should you choose to withdraw, the data associated with your record will be marked as incomplete, and removed from the retained data after the session. If you withdraw during the experiment, you are entitled to a \$6 show-up fee, but only participants who complete the study will receive additional earnings. Please raise your hand if you have any questions regarding your participation in this study. Please press the continue button below if you understand and agree to participate in this study.



You will now be presented with an example decision list and will be asked comprehension questions about it.

If you incorrectly answer any of the comprehension questions, you will be re-directed to answer that question again. After you correctly answer all comprehension questions, you will proceed to make your decisions in this study.

Please press the button below whenever you are ready.



Participant Number: 3384

Example Decision List

In this example list:

- Option A is always that you receive \$10.
- Option B is that we donate some dollar amount to the children at Children's Hospital on your behalf. As you proceed down the list, the amount the children receive for the playrooms will increase from \$0 to \$10.

Your task is to decide the smallest amount that we would have to donate to the children at Children's Hospital on your behalf to give up your \$10. In other words, you will indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B.

Option A	Option B
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$0.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$2.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$4.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$6.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$8.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$10.00



Comprehension Questions

The following displays how a participant could indicate the point at which she would be willing to give up option A for option B. Her preferred option in each row of the decision list is highlighted in green.

Option A	Option B
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$0.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$2.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$4.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$6.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$8.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$10.00

Question 1

If the second row was selected as the decision that counts for payment, then:

The participant would receive nothing, and the children would receive \$2

The participant would receive \$10, and the children would receive nothing

The participant would receive \$10, and the children would receive \$2

Participant Number: 3384

Comprehension Questions

The following displays how a participant could indicate the point at which she would be willing to give up option A for option B. Her preferred option in each row of the decision list is highlighted in green.

Option A	Option B
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$0.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$2.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$4.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$6.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$8.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$10.00

Question 2

If the sixth row was selected as the decision that counts for payment, then:

The participant would receive nothing, and the children would receive \$10

The participant would receive \$10, and the children would receive nothing

The participant would receive \$10, and the children would receive \$10

Main Task

You will now be asked to complete 5 blocks of decision lists. Note that one row of one of these decision lists will be randomly and fairly selected to be implemented for payment.

Please read the instructions carefully at the beginning of each block before making your decisions. You can access the calculator by clicking on the calculator at the top of your screen.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand and someone will come to your seat to answer them. Please press the button below whenever you are ready to begin.



Participant Number: 3384

Main Task

On the next page, you will complete 1 decision list. In this list, option A will be fixed and option B will vary as follows:

- Option A is always that you receive \$10.
- Option B is that we donate some dollar amount to the children at Children's Hospital on your behalf. As you proceed down the list, the amount the children receive for the playrooms will increase from \$0 to \$30.

Your task: Please decide the smallest amount that we would have to donate to the children at Children's Hospital for you to give up your \$10. In other words, please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B.

Note that your preferred option in each row of the decision list will be highlighted in green.



Main Task



Your task: Please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B. Contributions made today will go toward sustaining the 13 playrooms available to children at Children's Hospital.

Option A	Option B
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$0.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$1.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$3.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$4.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$6.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$7.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$9.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$10.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$12.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$13.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$15.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$16.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$18.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$19.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$21.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$22.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$25.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$27.00
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$28.50
You get \$10.00	Children at Children's Hospital get \$30.00

OK

Participant Number: 3384

Main Task

Next, you will complete 4 decision lists. In these lists, option A is fixed and option B varies as follows:

- Option A is always that you receive \$10 with some probability and \$0 otherwise.
- Option B is that you receive some dollar amount. As you proceed down the list, the amount you receive will increase from \$0 to \$10.

Your task: Please decide the smallest amount that you would accept to give up your chance to receive \$10 with some probability. In other words, please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B.

Note that your preferred option in each row of the decision list will be highlighted in green.

Continue

Example of Self-risk/Self-certain price list:

Participant Number: 3384 Ma	ain Task	
Your task: Please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B.		
Option A	Option B	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$0.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$0.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$1.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$1.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$2.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$2.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$3.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$3.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$4.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$4.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$5.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$5.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$6.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$6.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$7.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$7.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$8.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$8.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$9.00	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$9.50	
You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	You get \$10.00	

Participant Number: 3384 Main Task

Next, you will complete 4 decision lists. In these lists, option A is fixed and option B varies as follows:

- Option A is always that we donate \$24.00 to the children at Children's Hospital with some probability, and \$0 otherwise, on your behalf.
- Option B is that you receive some dollar amount. As you proceed down the list, the amount you receive will increase from \$0 to \$10.

Your task: Please decide the smallest amount that you would accept to give up your chance to donate \$24.00 to the children at Children's Hospital with some probability. In other words, please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B.

Note that your preferred option in each row of the decision list will be highlighted in green.

Continue

Example of Charity-risk/Self-certain price list:

Participant Number: 3384 Your task: Please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B. Contributions made today will go toward sustaining the 13 playrooms available to children at Children's Hospital. Option B Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$0.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$0.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$1.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$1.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$2.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$2.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$3.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$3.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$4.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$5.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$5.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$6.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$6.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$7.00 You get \$7.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$8.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$8.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$9.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$9.50 Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$10.00

Participant Number: 3384 Main Task

Next, you will complete 4 decision lists. In these lists, option A is fixed and option B varies as follows:

- Option A is always that you receive \$10 with some probability, and \$0 otherwise.
- Option B is that we donate some dollar amount to the children at Children's Hospital on your behalf. As you proceed down the list, the amount the children receive for the playrooms will increase from \$0 to \$24.00.

Your task: Please decide the smallest amount we would have to donate to the children at Children's Hospital for you to give up your chance of receiving \$10 with some probability. In other words, please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B.

Note that your preferred option in each row of the decision list will be highlighted in green.

Continu

Example of Self-risk/Charity-certain price list:

Participant Number: 3384 Your task: Please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B. Contributions made today will go toward sustaining the 13 playrooms available to children at Children's Hospital. Option A Option B You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$0.00 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$1.20 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$2.40 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$3.60 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$4.80 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$7.20 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$8.40 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$9.60 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$10.80 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$12.00 Children at Children's Hospital get \$13.20 Children at Children's Hospital get \$14.40 Children at Children's Hospital get \$15.60 Children at Children's Hospital get \$16.80 Children at Children's Hospital get \$18.00 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$19.20 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$20.40 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$21.60 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$22.80 You get \$10.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00

Participant Number: 3384 Main Task

Next, you will complete 4 decision lists. In these lists, option A is fixed and option B varies as follows:

- Option A is always that we donate \$24.00 to the children at Children's Hospital with some probability, and \$0 otherwise, on your behalf.
- Option B is that we donate some dollar amount to the children at Children's Hospital on your behalf. As
 you proceed down the list, the amount the children receive for the playrooms will increase from \$0 to
 \$24.00.


Your task: Please decide the smallest amount that we would have to donate to the children at Children's Hospital for you to give up your chance to donate \$24.00 with some probability. In other words, please indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B.

Note that your preferred option in each row of the decision list will be highlighted in green.


Continue

Example of Charity-risk/Charity-certain price list:

•	in Task
	you would be willing to give up option A for option B. he 13 playrooms available to children at Children's Hospital.
Option A	Option B
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$0.00
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$1.20
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$2.40
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$3.60
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$4.80
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$6.00
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$7.20
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$8.40
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$9.60
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$10.80
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	Children at Children's Hospital get \$12.00
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$13.20
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$14.40
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	Children at Children's Hospital get \$15.60
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$16.80
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$18.00
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$19.20
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$20.40
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$21.60
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$22.80
Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwis	e Children at Children's Hospital get \$24.00



Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements. The options range from strongly disagree to strongly agree. I made each decision in this study carefully Strongly Disagree Strongly Disagree Understood what my decisions meant for my payment and the Children's Hospital's payment	I made each decision in this study carefully Strongly Disagree CCC Strongly Agree I made decisions in this study randomly Strongly Disagree CCC Strongly Agree	Participant Number: 3384 Please complete the survey below.			
I made decisions in this study randomly Strongly Disagree CCC Strongly Agree I understood what my decisions meant for my payment and the Children's Hospital's payment	I made decisions in this study randomly Strongly Disagree CCC Strongly Agree I understood what my decisions meant for my payment and the Children's Hospital's payment	Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements. The options range from strongly disagree to strongly agree.			
I understood what my decisions meant for my Strongly Disagree CCC Strongly Agree payment and the Children's Hospital's payment	I understood what my decisions meant for my Strongly Disagree CCC Strongly Agree payment and the Children's Hospital's payment	I made each decision in this study carefully	Strongly Disagree CCCC Strongly Agree		
payment and the Children's Hospital's payment	payment and the Children's Hospital's payment	I made decisions in this study randomly	Strongly Disagree CCCC Strongly Agree		
	I feel favorable about the UPIMC Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh Strongly Disagree CCC Strongly Agree	I understood what my decisions meant for my payment and the Children's Hospital's payment	Strongly Disagree CCCC Strongly Agree		
I feel favorable about the UPMC Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh Strongly Disagree CCCC Strongly Agree		I feel favorable about the UPI/IC Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh	Strongly Disagree CCCC Strongly Agree		
			CONTINUE		



Bonus Round 1

In this round, you will have another opportunity to donate to the children at the Children's Hospital. You will be randomly paired with another participant in this session. Your earnings and donations will depend both on your choice and the choice of your partner.

Half of the pairs in today's session will be randomly selected to have their joint Bonus Round 1 decisions implemented for payment.

Description of Bonus Round 1 Task: Both you and your partner will be given \$1 in this round. You both will have three possible options: "Keep' the \$1, "Pass' it to the charity, or attempt to 'Take'

- If you choose 'Keep,' you will retain your \$1
- If you choose 'Pass' and your partner does not 'Take,' we will donate \$4 to the children at Children's Hospital on your behalf
- If you choose 'Pass' and your partner chooses 'Take,' you lose the \$1 and the \$4 donation is not made
- If you choose to 'Take' you will retain your \$1, and you will take the \$4 donation if your partner chooses 'Pass'

The money donated today will go to fund the playrooms for the children at Children's Hosptial.

Please press 'Continue' to proceed.



Bonus Round 1: Decision

Both you and your partner have \$1.

You both have three possible options: 'Keep' the \$1, 'Pass' it to the charity, or attempt to 'Take'

Keep: Keep the \$1.

Pass: Give up the \$1 in an attempt to give \$4 to the children at Children's Hospital

Take: Take any donation, or keep the \$1 if there is no donation

You have selected:

Keep

Press below to confirm.



Participant Number: 3384 Bonus Round 1: Question 1

Before proceeding, we would like to ask you two questions. If your pair's Bonus Round 1 decisions are not selected for payment, we will instead select one of the Bonus Round 1 questions and pay you based on the accuracy of your answer.

In Bonus Round 1, your partner had three options:

Keep: Keep the \$1.

Pass: Give up the \$1 in an attempt to give \$4 to the children at Children's Hospital

Take: Take any donation, or keep the \$1 if there is no donation

What option do you think your partner selected?


You will receive \$1 if your answer is correct and Question 1 is selected for payment.

Please make your guess:



Participant Number: 3384	Bonus Round 1: Question 1	
In Bonus Round 1, your p	artner had three options:	
Keep: Keep the \$1.		
Pass: Give up the \$1 in an attempt to give \$4 to the children at Children's Hospital		
Take: Take any donation	, or keep the \$1 if there is no donation	
What option do you think	your partner selected?	
You will receive \$1 if you	r answer is correct and Question 1 is selected for payment.	
You have selected:		
	My Partner Kept	
Please click below to confirm.		
	Confirm	

In a few words, please explain why you think your partner selected the option you indicated in the previous question.	
CONTINUE	





Bonus Round 2

In this round, you will be asked to choose between two options, **X** and **Y**, which will result in different payoffs. You will make three of these decisions. Some of the payoff resulting from the option you choose will be yours to keep, and some will be donated on your behalf to the children at UPMC Children's Hospital. There are two possible states, **state 1** and **state 2**, and the payoffs associated with each option depend on this state.

In some cases, you will be aware of this state, and will know the amount you will keep and the amount that will be donated on your behalf to the children at UPMC Children's Hospital. In other cases, you will not know the state initially, but you will be given the option of revealing it before making your choice. Payoffs that depend on the state will be denoted by "?" (a question mark) when you do not know the state. There is an equal chance of each state occuring, that it is as if the state is determined by a coin flip.

Press 'Next Page' below to see the remaining instructions.

Next Page

Participant Number: 3384

Bonus Round 2

For this round only, two people in this session will be selected at random by the computer to be paid and to have a donation made to the children at UPMC Children's Hospital on their behalf. Each individual in the session has an equal chance of being selected, regardless of their choices.

If you are randomly selected, the pay you will receive from this round will be from **one** of the decisions you make, with each decision having an equal chance of being chosen. If you are not selected, your decisions in this round will not be implemented for payment. You will be informed on your computer screen at the end of the study if you are randomly selected.

Contributions made to the Children's hospital today will go toward sustaining 13 playrooms for the children. Press 'Continue' below to proceed to the first of three decisions.

Continue Previous Page

Х

Bonus Round 2: Decision 1

Q1. The state is unknown. The grids below show the payoffs under State 1 and State 2, respectively.

State 1

Yours to keep: \$6,

Donation to Children's Hospital: \$1 Your Choices Yours to keep: \$5, Donation to Children's Hospital: \$5

Your Choices

	Otato 2
х	Yours to keep: \$6, Donation to Children's Hospital: \$5
Y	Yours to keep: \$5 , Donation to Children's Hospital: \$1

State 2

Press 'Continue' below to make your decision.

Participant Number: 3384 **Bonus Round 2: Decision 1**

Q1. The state is unknown. The grids below show the payoffs under State 1 and State 2, respectively.

State 1

Yours to keep: \$6, Х Donation to Children's Hospital: \$1 Your Yours to keep: \$5, Choices Donation to Children's Hospital: \$5

x	Yours to keep: \$6, Donation to Children's Hospital: \$5
Y	Yours to keep: \$5 , Donation to Children's Hospital: \$1

State 2

Your actual decision is below. Remember you do not know whether you are making a decision in state 1 or state 2. You can choose Option X or Option Y now, or ask to reveal the state before you choose. If you want to learn the state before you choose, please click the 'Reveal State' button.

Your

Choices

Yours to keep: \$6, Х Donation to Children's Hospital: ? Yours to keep: \$5, Υ Donation to Children's Hospital: ?

Bonus Round 2: Decision 2

Q2. The state is State 1 as shown below. Please choose Option X or Option Y by clicking one of the buttons below.

x	Yours to keep: \$6, Donation to Children's Hospital: \$1
Y	Yours to keep: \$5, Donation to Children's Hospital: \$5

Please select your preferred option under State 1:



Participant Number: 3384


Bonus Round 2: Decision 3

Q3. The state is State 2 as shown below. Please choose Option X or Option Y by clicking one of the buttons below.

x	Yours to keep: \$6, Donation to Children's Hospital: \$5
Y	Yours to keep: \$5, Donation to Children's Hospital: \$1

Please select your preferred option under State 2:





Instructions from the Exley Replication

These instructions were handed to each participant at the beginning of the experiment and read aloud by the experimenter.

Instructions

Welcome and thank you for your participation. This is a study on decision making. Please turn off your cell phones and similar devices and place them in your bag or on the top shelf. Please do not talk to or in any way try to communicate with other participants in the room.

Payments

In this study, you will receive a \$10 minimum payment. This \$10 is yours to keep. Whatever you earn from the study will be added to this minimum payment.

All payments will be made in private with cash at the end of the study. Additionally, you will have the opportunity to donate to children at UPMC Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh.

Main Task

There are three tasks in this study: a main task and two bonus rounds. The following instructions explain how you may earn money from the main task. You may earn further payments from the bonus rounds at the end of the study.

In the main task you will be presented with a series of decision lists. Each decision list consists of a series of different rows with two options, option A and option B. For each row, you will have to select your preferred option.

Your task in each decision list will be to pick the first row where you would switch from option A to option B. In other words, you should indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B. The option you select in each row of the decision list will then be highlighted in green. If you don't want to switch, you can just mark your preferred option green throughout the list.

Once you have indicated your choices in all decision lists, the computer will randomly and fairly select one decision list for payment, and then select one row from that list.

If for that row, you chose option A, then option A will be implemented. If you chose option B, then option B will be implemented. Every row from every decision list is equally likely to be selected for payment. So you should treat each decision list as if it determines your main task payment.

Option A and option B will vary across decision lists.

Option A and option B will involve money being given to you or the children at Children's Hospital. Option B will never involve uncertainty while option A may involve some uncertainty. For each option, you will be informed of the recipient in both options (the children or you) and if there is any uncertainty involved in option A.

Consider an example decision list in the table below. In this example decision list, option A is fixed, and option B varies as follows:

- -Option A is fixed, but uncertain, you receive \$10 with 75% probability, and \$0 otherwise.
- -Option B is that <u>you receive some dollar amount.</u> As you proceed down the list, the amount increases from \$0 to \$10.

Your task is to decide the smallest amount that you would need to give up your chance to receive \$10 with 75% probability. In other words, you will indicate the point at which you would be willing to give up option A for option B.

Option A	Option B
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$0
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$1
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$2
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$3
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$4
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$5
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$6
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$7
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$8
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$9
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$10

Imagine for a moment the smallest amount that you would accept to give up your chance to receive \$10 with 75% probability (to aid your decisions, we have provided a calculator located on the top right corner of your decision screens). Suppose your answer is \$6, this choice will be indicated as shown in the picture below:

Option A	Option B
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$0
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$1
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$2
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$3
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$4
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$5
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$6
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$7
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$8
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$9
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$10

Option A	Option B	
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$0	
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$1	
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$2	
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$3	
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$4	
You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise	You get \$5	
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$6	
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$7	
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$8	
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$9	
 You get \$10 with 75% probability; and \$0 otherwise 	You get \$10	

Further, suppose that this example decision list was randomly selected for payment. Then:

-If the third row was randomly selected (indicated with the first arrow above), then option A will be implemented. The computer will randomly and fairly choose a number from 1 to 100. If the chosen number is between 1 and 75 (inclusive) you would receive \$10. If the number is between 76 and 100 (inclusive) you would receive \$0.

-If the eighth row is randomly selected (indicated with the second arrow above), then option B will be implemented, and you would instead receive \$7.

The above explains how you make choices in ONE decision list. However, in this study, you will be given several decision lists and you must make a choice for each one.

Each list appears on a separate page. Lists are grouped into 5 blocks, where each block involves different types of decisions (i.e., with respect to whether option A and/or option B involve money being given to the children or to you, and whether option A involves uncertainty).

We will randomly and fairly select one row from one decision list for payment. If that results in a payment to you, you will be paid the relevant amount in cash directly after the study using your payment number. This payment number does not correspond to your seat number and cannot be linked to your decisions or your computer terminal. If the selected decision results in a payment to charity, we will donate the money to the children at the Children's Hospital on your behalf. At the end of the experiment, an assistant will submit a request to University of Pittsburgh for a check to be made out to the Children's Hospital corresponding to the funds donated in your session. After we receive this check from the University, it will be mailed to the Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh. The receipt from this donation will be posted outside 4930A Posvar Hall.

Donating to children at Children's Hospital helps support their most urgent needs—the needs that insurance does not cover. Donations will help improve the quality of life for families struggling with childhood illness. Contributions made today will specifically go toward sustaining the 13 playrooms available to patients at the Children's Hospital. These medical-free zones help provide children a place to escape from talk of their tests and treatments, and allow them to engage in fun, therapeutic activities. Playrooms are funded solely through donations.

If you have any questions about the procedures, please raise your hand now and one of us will come to your seat to answer your questions.

SCREENSHOTS FROM THE DI TELLA ET AL. REPLICATION

The following are screenshots for Allocators


Participant Number: 2 Role Assignment and Instructions


Thank you for participating in our study. This is a study about decision making. The other people in this room are also participating in the study. You must not talk to them or communicate with them in any way. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to where you are sitting to answer your question in private. Please refrain from asking questions out loud or communicating with other participants.

In this study, you will be randomly assigned to one of two roles: **Allocator** or **Seller**. You will receive your role assignment on your computer following this screen. You will maintain this role throughout the study. You will then be paired with another participant in this session assigned to the other role. Your decisions will affect your payment and the payment of the other person you are paired with. Specific details about how your decisions will affect your earnings will be provided as you move along in the study. Your minimum possible earnings for completing the study are \$6.

You will remain anonymous in the study. Only an ID number will identify your decisions, and any research data collected during the course of the study will only identify your decisions by that number.

Next Page






Role Assignment and Instructions

After you receive your 10 tokens on account of having completed the five tasks, you will be paired with another participant in the session assigned to the role of **Seller**. Your partner **Seller** also has 10 tokens. Between the two of you, you have 20 tokens. In other words, you have to decide how many tokens out of your 10 tokens you are going to keep or give to your partner **Seller**, and how many of your partner **Seller's** tokens to you are going to take or leave.

There are two types of **Allocators**: those who can move up to 8 of each participant's tokens, and those who can move up to 2 of each participant's tokens. You are to move up to 8 tokens, which means that you can keep any number of tokens between **2 and 18** of the 20 tokens. Your partner **Seller** will keep the remaining tokens. In the table below, your options include any row without asterisks, and any row with one (*) asterisk.



Participant Number: 2 Role Assignment and Instructions

At the same time you are making your decision, your partner Seller is deciding to set the price at which each of the 20 tokens will be sold. Your partner Seller chooses between two options:

Option A: Each token will be worth \$1.50.

Option B: Each token will be worth \$0.50, and the Seller will receive a bonus of \$5.

Your partner Seller will not be able to know how you distributed the tokens until after they have set the price of the tokens. At the same time you as the Allocator will not know your partner Seller's choice between Option A or Option B until after you have distributed the tokens. Remember that your decisions are anonymous: neither participant knows which of the other participants in the session they are paired with.



Role Assignment and Instructions

At the same time you are making your decision, your partner Seller is deciding to set the price at which each of the 20 tokens will be sold. Your partner Seller chooses between two onlines:

Option A: Each token will be worth \$1.50.

Option B: Each token will be worth \$0.50, and the Seller will receive a bonus of \$5.

Your partner **Seller** will not be able to know how you distributed the tokens until after they have set the price of the tokens. At the same time you as the **Allocator** will not know your partner **Seller's** choice between **Option A** or **Option B** until after you have distributed the tokens. Remember that your decisions are anonymous: neither participant knows which of the other participants in the session they are paired with.



Participant Number: 2 Role Assignment and Instructions

Before you make your decision, let us take a look at an example:

If the Seller chooses Option B, \$0.50 per token, and the Allocator chooses to keep 12 tokens, the Allocator will collect:

\$0.50 x 12 = \$6

And the Seller will collect:

$$(\$0.50 \times 8) + \$5 = \$9$$

On the other hand, if the Seller chooses Option A, \$1.50 per token, and the Allocator chooses to keep 10 tokens, the Allocator will collect

\$1.50 x 10 = \$15


And the Seller will collect:


\$1.50 x 10 = \$15

Please note that your partner Seller knows that there are two types of Allocators: those who can move up to 8 of each participant's tokens, and those who can move up to 2 of each participant's tokens. However, your partner Seller DOES NOT know which type of Allocator you are.

Please click the 'Next Page' button to proceed.









Participant Number: 2	Comprehension Questions
Q1. Suppose that the A	locator decides to keep 10 tokens and leave 10 tokens to the Seller . If the Seller chooses Option B (\$0.50 per token), how much will each collect (in dollars)?
	Allocator: 5
	Seller: 10
Your answer is correct! At a price of \$0.5 Seller will be	Oper token, the Seller will get \$5 from the value of their tokens plus \$5 for choosing Option B . The total payment to the \$10 (\$0.50 x 10 + \$5). The Allocator will get \$5 (\$0.50 x 10) from the value of their tokens.
	Continue





Participant Number: 2	Comprehension Questions	
Q2. Suppose the Allocator de	ides to keep 10 tokens and leave 10 tokens to the Seller , while at the same time the Seller chooses Option A (\$1.50 per token). How much will each collect (in dollars)?	
	Allocator: 15	
	Seller: 15	
Your answer is correct! At a p	rice of \$1.50 per token, the Seller will get \$15.00 (\$1.50 x 10) and the Allocator will get \$15.00 (\$1.50 x 10).	

















Work Task

000001 001010 110101 000110 110101

How many zeros are in the table?

The last entry was **correct**. You completed all 5 units of the task.

> You counted 5 tables correctly. You have currently earned 10 tokens.

You have completed the work task. Please click 'Continue' to proceed to the next step.



Participant Number: 2

Main Decision


In the box below, please make your token distribution decision by clicking, dragging, and releasing tokens into either the **Allocator** and **Seller** boxes. You may move any of the **green** tokens, but may not move any of the **red** tokens. Press 'Continue' when you are ready to submit your token distribution decision.

Allocator Tokens

Tokens: 7

Seller Tokens

• •



Questions

Over the next few pages, you will be asked a series of questions. The answer to one of these questions will be randomly selected for payment. Each question has an equally likely chance of being picked. Information about how your answers may affect your payment will be provided alongside each question.

As explained to you in the instructions, your partner Seller selects the value of each token from two options:

Option A: \$1.50 per token

Option B: \$0.50 per token with a \$5 bonus payment for the Seller

What option do you think your partner Seller selected? If this question is randomly selected for payment, and if your answer coincides with the actual choice made by your partner Seller, you will receive a bonus payment of \$5.

Please click 'Continue' to confirm your belief of Option B: \$0.50 per token

Click 'Back' if you would like to revise your decision.



Participant Number: 2 Questions In a few words, please explain why you think your partner Seller selected the option you indicated in the previous question.

Participant Number: 2 Questions In this session, 1 individuals were assigned the role of Seller (including your assigned partner Seller). Each of these Sellers faced the same choice between Option A and Option B. Out of these 1 Sellers, how many do you think selected Option B (\$0.50 per token with \$5 bonus payment to Seller only)? If this questions is randomly selected for payment, your compensation for this question will be as follows: \$8 if you choose the exact number of Sellers who actually chose Option B; \$6 if your choice is 1 more OR less than the actual number of Sellers who chose Option B; Please choose the number of Sellers that you think selected Option B.

The following are screenshots for Sellers


Participant Number: 1 Role Assignment and Instructions


Thank you for participating in our study. This is a study about decision making. The other people in this room are also participating in the study. You must not talk to them or communicate with them in any way. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to where you are sitting to answer your question in private. Please refrain from asking questions out loud or communicating with other participants.

In this study, you will be randomly assigned to one of two roles: **Allocator** or **Seller**. You will receive your role assignment on your computer following this screen. You will maintain this role throughout the study. You will then be paired with another participant in this session assigned to the other role. Your decisions will affect your payment and the payment of the other person you are paired with. Specific details about how your decisions will affect your earnings will be provided as you move along in the study. Your minimum possible earnings for completing the study are \$6.

You will remain anonymous in the study. Only an ID number will identify your decisions, and any research data collected during the course of the study will only identify your decisions by that number.

Next Page





Role Assignment and Instructions

After you receive your 10 tokens on account of having completed the five tasks, you will be paired with another participant in the session assigned to the role of **Allocator**. Your partner **Allocator** also has 10 tokens. Between the two of you, you have 20 tokens. Your partner **Allocator** is going to distribute the 20 tokens between the two of you. In other words, your partner **Allocator** is going to decide how many of your 10 tokens to take or leave, and how many of your partner **Allocator's** tokens to keep or give to you. At the same time as the **Seller**, you need to select the value at which you want to sell the 20 tokens.

Option A: Each token will be worth \$1.50.

Option B: Each token will be worth \$0.50, and as compensation you will receive \$5 just for yourself.

Your partner **Allocator** will not be able to know if you chose **Option A** or **Option B** until after the tokens have been distributed. At the same time you as the **Seller** will not know how the **Allocator** distributed the tokens until after having chosen either **Option A** or **Option B**. Remember that your decisions are anonymous: neither participant knows which of the other participants in the session they are paired with.



Participant Number: 1

Role Assignment and Instructions

Before you make your decision, let us take a look at an example:

If the Seller chooses Option B, \$0.50 per token, and the Allocator chooses to keep 12 tokens, the Allocator will collect

And the Seller will collect:

$$(\$0.50 \times 8) + \$5 = \$9$$


On the other hand, if the Seller chooses Option A, \$1.50 per token, and the Allocator chooses to keep 10 tokens, the Allocator will collect:

And the Seller will collect:

Finally, you need to know that there are two types of **Allocators**: those who can move up to 8 of each participant's tokens, and those who can move up to 2 of each participant's tokens. It is equally likely that you are paired with either **Allocator** type. What you do not know is which type of **Allocator** you are paired with.


Please click the 'Next Page' button to proceed.









Participant Number: 1	Comprehension Questions	
Q1. Suppose that the A	ocator decides to keep 10 tokens and leave 10 tokens to the Seller. If the Seller chooses Option B (\$0.50 per token), how much will each collect (in dollars)?	
	Allocator: 5	
	Seller: 10	
Your answer is correct! At a price of \$0. Seller will be	per token, the Seller will get \$5 from the value of their tokens plus \$5 for choosing Option B . The total payment to the 10 (\$0.50 x 10 + \$5). The Allocator will get \$5 (\$0.50 x 10) from the value of their tokens. Continue	




Participant Number: 1	Comprehension Questions
Q2. Suppose the Allocator dec	des to keep 10 tokens and leave 10 tokens to the Seller , while at the same time the Seller chooses Option A (\$1.50 per token). How much will each collect (in dollars)? Allocator:
	Seller: 15
Your answer is correct! At a p	ice of \$1.50 per token, the Seller will get \$15.00 (\$1.50 x 10) and the Allocator will get \$15.00 (\$1.50 x 10).




Participant Number: 1 Comprehension Questions Q3. Other participants in the lab can find out the names of Sellers who chose either Option A or Option B during or after the experiment. Your answer is correct! The decisions of all the participants are anonymous.





You have completed the comprehension questions and this concludes your instructions. Please click 'Continue' to proceed to the next step, in which you will complete the five work tasks.

Participant Number: 1	Work Task
110111 111000 011111 101111 100011 110100	How many zeros are in the table? OK You counted 0 tables correctly. You have currently earned 0 tokens.



Work Task

001101 000100 000010 101101 001001 010101

How many zeros are in the table?

The last entry was **correct**. You completed all 5 units of the task.

You counted 5 tables correctly.
You have currently earned 10 tokens.

You have completed the work task. Please click 'Continue' to proceed to the next step.



Participant Number: 1

Main Decision

Please select the value of the tokens that your partner Allocator will distribute.

Remember your partner **Allocator** will not be able to know if you chose **Option A** or **Option B** until after the tokens have been distributed. Recall your options are:

Option A: \$1.50 per token

Option B: \$0.50 per token, with a \$5 bonus payment for yourself only

Please make your choice below.



Main Decision

Choice Confirmation

Remember your partner **Allocator** will not be able to know if you chose **Option A** or **Option B** until after the tokens have been distributed. Recall your options are:

Option A: \$1.50 per token

Option B: \$0.50 per token, with a \$5 bonus payment for yourself only

Please make your choice below.

Please click 'Continue' to confirm your choice of Option B: \$0.50 per token

Click 'Back' if you would like to revise your decision.



The following are the screenshots for the bonus round for both allocators and sellers:

Participant Number: 2	Bonus Round
these decisions. Some of the payoff resu	between two options, X and Y, which will result in different payoffs. You will make three of ting from the option you choose will be yours to keep, and some will be donated on your behalf to possible states, state 1 and state 2, and the payoffs associated with each option depend on
to UPMC Children's Hospital with certaint revealing it before making your choice. Pr	tate, and will know the amount you will keep and the amount that will be donated on your behalf . In other cases, you will not know the state initially, but you will be given the option of lyoffs that depend on the state will be denoted by "?" (a question mark) when you do not know in flip, so there is an even chance of each state occurring.
Press `Next Page' below to see the rema	ning instructions.
	Next Page

Participant Number: 2 Bonus Round

For this stage only, two people in this session will be selected at random by the computer to be paid and to have a donation made to UPMC Children's Hospital on their behalf. Each individual in the session has an equal chance of being selected, regardless of their choices.

If you are randomly selected, the pay you will receive from this stage will be from **one** of the decisions you make, with each decision having a 1/3 chance of being chosen. If you are not randomly selected, your decisions in this stage will not be implemented. You will be informed on your computer screen at the end of the study if you are randomly selected.

Press 'Next Page' below to see the remaining instructions.

Next Page Previous Page

Participant Number: 2 Bonus Round

Donating to UPMC Children's Hospital helps support the most urgent needs of the hospital—the needs that insurance does not cover. Donations will help improve the quality of life for families struggling with childhood illness. Contributions made today will specifically go toward sustaining the 13 playrooms available to patients at the Children's Hospital. These medical-free zones help provide children a place to escape from talk of their tests and treatments, and allow them to engage in fun, therapeutic activities. Playrooms are stocked solely through donated funds.

Press 'Continue' below to proceed to the first of the three decisions.

Continue Previous Page

Participant Number: 2 Bonus Round: Decision 1

Q1. The state of the world is unknown. The grids below show the payoffs under State 1 and State 2, respectively.

Your Choices	х	Yours to keep: \$6, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$1
Choices	Y	Yours to keep: \$5, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$5

Your	x	Yours to keep: \$6, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$5
Choices	Y	Yours to keep: \$5, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$1

Reveal State

Your actual decision is below. You can choose Option X, Option Y, or to reveal the state of the world before choosing.

Yours to keep: \$6,
X Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: ?

Yours to keep: \$5,
Y Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: ?

Participant Number: 2 Bonus Round: Decision 1

Q1. The state of the world is revealed to be State 1.

Your Choices	х	Yours to keep: \$6, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$1
Choices	Y	Yours to keep: \$5, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$5

Your	x	Yours to keep: \$6, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$5
Choices	Y	Yours to keep: \$5, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$1

Your actual decision is below. You can choose Option X or Option Y.

х	Yours to keep: \$6, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$1
Υ	Yours to keep: \$5, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$5

Option X Option

Bonus Round: Decision 2

Q2. The state of the world is **State 1.** You can choose Option X or Option Y.

x	Yours to keep: \$6, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$1
Y	Yours to keep: \$5, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$5

Option X

Ontion

Participant Number: 2

Bonus Round: Decision 3

 $\textbf{Q3.} \ \, \text{The state of the world is } \textbf{State 2.} \ \, \text{You can choose Option X or Option Y}.$

x	Yours to keep: \$6, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$5
Y	Yours to keep: \$5, Donated to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh: \$1

Option X

Option Y

Did you understand the rules of the experiment?	 C Fully Understood C Almost Fully Understood © Partially Understood C Did Not Understand
How old are you?	22
What is your gender?	 C Male C Female I Non-binarythird gender C Prefer to self-describe
	If prefer to self describe:
In which field is your current major?	○ Natural Sciences or Engineering ○ Business or Social Sciences ⓒ Other
What is your current GPA?	○ 0.00-1.00 ○ 1.00-2.00 ○ 2.00-3.00 ○ 3.00-4.00
How much do you agree with the following statement. "Generally speaking, most people can be trusted"	C Strongly Agree C Agree C Neutral C Disagree C Strongly Disagree

Finally, the following is the reference handout distributed to all participants after they have read the instructions on the computer screen:

General Instructions

Allocator Decision

The **Allocator** must decide how to distribute the 20 tokens between themselves and their partner Seller, starting from an initial allocation of 10 tokens for each individual. Remember that there are two types of Allocators: ones who can move up to two tokens between themselves and their partner Seller, and ones who can move up to eight tokens. The table below lists all possible distributions of tokens:

Allocation Decision				
Allocator Tokens	Seller Tokens			
20**	0**			
19**	1**			
18*	2*			
17*	3*			
16*	4*			
15*	5*			
14*	6*			
13*	7*			
12	8			
11	9			
10	10			
9	11			
8	12			
7*	13*			
6*	14*			
5*	15*			
4*	16*			
3*	17*			
2*	18*			
1**	19**			
0**	20**			

^{*} Allocation is only possible if the Allocator is able to move up to eight tokens.

Seller Decision

The **Seller** must set the dollar amount at which the tokens will be valued. They can choose between two options:

Option A: Each token is worth \$1.50

Option B: Each token is worth \$0.50, and the Seller will receive a bonus of \$5.00

Both Allocators and Sellers will make their decisions without knowing what the other decided. Both decisions will affect the payment that each player receives.

Please see the next page to view a table of payoff possibilities

^{**} Allocation is not possible regardless of which Allocator type is randomly assigned.

A summary of all of the possible decisions and corresponding payoffs under both token values are listed in the table below:

Allocation Decision		Option A: Seller chooses \$1.50		Option B: Seller chooses \$0.50 + \$5.00	
Allocator Tokens	Seller Tokens	Allocator Payoff	Seller Payoff	Allocator Payoff	Seller Payoff
20**	0**	\$30.00**	\$0.00**	\$10.00**	\$5.00**
19**	1**	\$28.50**	\$1.50**	\$9.50**	\$5.50**
18*	2*	\$27.00*	\$3.00*	\$9.00*	\$6.00*
17*	3*	\$25.50*	\$4.50*	\$8.50*	\$6.50*
16*	4*	\$24.00*	\$6.00*	\$8.00*	\$7.00*
15*	5*	\$22.50*	\$7.50*	\$7.50*	\$7.50*
14*	6*	\$21.00*	\$9.00*	\$7.00*	\$8.00*
13*	7*	\$19.50*	\$10.50*	\$6.50*	\$8.50*
12	8	\$18.00	\$12.00	\$6.00	\$9.00
11	9	\$16.50	\$13.50	\$5.50	\$9.50
10	10	\$15.00	\$15.00	\$5.00	\$10.00
9	11	\$13.50	\$16.50	\$4.50	\$10.50
8	12	\$12.00	\$18.00	\$4.00	\$11.00
7*	13*	\$10.50*	\$19.50*	\$3.50*	\$11.50*
6*	14*	\$9.00*	\$21.00*	\$3.00*	\$12.00*
5*	15*	\$7.50*	\$22.50*	\$2.50*	\$12.50*
4*	16*	\$6.00*	\$24.00*	\$2.00*	\$13.00*
3*	17*	\$4.50*	\$25.50*	\$1.50*	\$13.50*
2*	18*	\$3.00*	\$27.00*	\$1.00*	\$14.00*
1**	19**	\$1.50**	\$28.50**	\$0.50**	\$14.50**
0**	20**	\$0.00**	\$30.00**	\$0.00**	\$15.00**

^{*} Allocation is only possible if the Allocator is able to move up to eight tokens.

** Allocation is not possible regardless of which Allocator type is randomly assigned.